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Financial
Performance
Guarantees
a

The State of Practice
Wayne M. Feiden, Raymond J. Burby, and
Edward J. Kaiser
Financial performance guarantees are tools for
ensuring that funds needed to pay for improvements called for by development permits and a p
provals are available in the event a developer defaults on permit requirements. Once limited to
surety bonds and cash escrows, new types of
guarantees have been developed and are coming
into common use. Standby letters of credit, in
particular, are being used more widely and have
a number of advantages. To use guarantees successfully, municipal governments must make
careful decisions about a number of administrative matters. Evidence from 309 municipalities
reported in this article can help local planners
make the right choices.

Feiden is an environmental planner with the city of
Northampton, Massachusetts. Burby and Kaiser, editors
of this journal from 1983 to 1988, are professors of planning in the Department of City and Regional Planning,
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
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Financial performance guarantees are designed to ensure that funds needed to complete public and private
improvements required by local ordinances or development approvals are available in the event of a developer’s default or bankruptcy. Guarantees create legal and
financial incentives for developers to perform work required as a condition for issuance of permits, and they
make it easier for governments to finish such work if a
default occurs. When properly designed, they also contribute to a number of other obiectives. Thev can make
administration of land use and environmental regulations
easier and more eficient, reduce the frequency and expense of litigation, provide protection for consumers
purchasing property in new projects, and, importantly,
allow communities to be more flexible in responding to
developers’ needs for more time to complete infrastructure after occupancy permits are issued or to delay completion of landscaping until weather conditions are favorable.
Performance guarantees have long been used in local
subdivision regulation, where they are “an esoteric but
important part of the planning process” (Rogal 1974),
but not much is known about local governments’ experience with them here or in other regulatory areas. In
this article, we describe the frequency with which financial performance guarantees and accompanying administrative forms and techniques are used in the United
States, and we draw on local Dlanners’ exDerience and
perceptions to indicate which approaches to guarantees
and their administration seem to be working best in actual
practice. Our information expands and updates the only
previous survey of the use of guarantees (Seidel 1978),
and it provides planners interested in adopting or revising
their financial performance guarantees with feedback
from practical experience that they can use to augment
various commentators’ words of wisdom (e.g., American
Law Institute 1976; Freilich and Levi 1975; Kelley and
Schultz 1988; Mandelker 1982; Rogal 1974; Schultz and
Kelley 1985; Yearwood 197 1).
The data for this article come from questionnaires returned by planners working in 309 municipalities across
the United States. The survey, completed during the
summer of 1988, was sent to a random sample of 500
municipalities with populations between 15,000 and
500,000.’ Although planners working in communities
that use financial guarantees may be slightly overrepresented in our data, since they are more likely to be
interested in the topic and thus to have returned a questionnaire, we believe the sample size and response rate
(62 percent) are high enough for readers to have confidence in our findingsS2Also, comparison of the distribution of responding and nonresponding municipalities
reveals no significant differences between respondents
and nonrespondents by region or p ~ p u l a t i o n . ~

How Guarantees Are Used
The survey confirmed that subdivision regulations authorize the use of financial performance guarantees far
more frequently than do any other municipal regulations
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(Table 1). That practice is reflected in the literature as
well, which discusses almost exclusively the use of guarantees as a tool for obtaining compliance with subdivision
regulations (e.g., Kelley and Schultz 1988; Rogal 1974).
The survey also revealed, however, that financial performance guarantees now are used for a wide variety of
other land use and environmental regulations as well. A
substantial minority of jurisdictions (between 17 percent
and 30 percent) write performance guarantees into zoning, stormwater, erosionlsedimentation, and on-site
sewage regulations. In those jurisdictions, guarantees
were required for a substantial (but minority) proportion
of the total number of the permits issued for each type
of regulation during the last full year of record.
Traditionally, local governments have used financial
performance guarantees to ensure the completion of improvements to be dedicated to the public. Many of the
improvements required by subdivision, zoning, erosion
control, stormwater, and on-site sewage regulations,
however, are not dedicated to the public but instead remain in private ownership (these include such improvements as landscaping, storm drainage facilities in commercial and apartment projects, and septic tanks). A majority of the communities (56 percent) use financial
guarantees in some cases to ensure that required improvements which will be privately owned are built to
specified standards and are completed before a project
is occupied.

Types of Guarantees
Several types of financial performance guarantees are
available to local governments. Performance (surety)
bonds and cash escrows are described most frequently
in the literature, but other options are also available and
are commonly used. These include property escrows,
standby letters of credit, improvement credit agreements,
and liens and covenants. We will describe each of these
briefly and then examine the frequency with which they
are being used.

Performance Bonds
Where a performance bond serves as the guarantee, a
surety company agrees to pay the value of the bond to a
local government (the obligee) if a developer (the prin-

TABLE 1: Use of financial performance guarantees with regulations

Type of regulation
Subdivision
Zoning
Stormwater
Erosion/sedimentation control
On-site sewage

Municipalities
using financial
performance
guarantees to
ensure compliance

Permits
issued
with a
guarantee
required

with regulation ("/o)

("N

76
30
28
23
17

70
33
27
27
21
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cipal) defaults on the permit conditions. The greater assets
of a surety company assure the local government that
the financial resources will be there to complete required
improvements. Performance bonds have some similarities
to insurance, because the surety company is taking some
risk and surety exists to reduce the risk to local government. But, unlike the conditions with insurance, the risk
is not spread widely, and as a result, surety companies
take only limited risks. Because of that, performance
bonds can be difficult or impossible for small or new
companies to obtain (Seidel 1978). For larger developers
with collateral, however, obtaining a performance bond
at a reasonable premium has not been difficult (Rogal
1974).
If a developer is in danger of default, a surety company
may assist in completing required improvements, possibly
by loaning the developer required funds, if that might
avoid greater liability. Once a developer defaults, a surety
company has several options: it can finance completion
of the project by the original developer and, if the project
is a success, recover its capital; it can hire a new contractor to finish the project: or it can pay off the bond
principal. If the surety company takes an option other
than paying off the face value of the bond directly to
local government, its liability may exceed the amount of
the bond.
Most commentators believe that surety companies
would rather pay off a bond than follow the first two
courses of action (Schroeder 1982; Webster 1982; Schultz
and Kelley 1985). Our data indicate, however, that surety
companies are somewhat more likely to arrange to have
an improvement completed than to pay local governments the amount of the bond. Thirty-four percent of the
municipalities we surveyed reported that, when developers defaulted, the surety company gave them the funds,
40 percent said the surety company arranged to have the
improvement completed, 16 percent reported both experiences, and 10 percent reported a variety of other
outcomes.
Schultz and Kelley (1985) argue that, while performance surety bonds are better than no guarantee, they
are the least preferable of the financial guarantees available because local governments often have to go to court
to collect (and, they argue, surety bonds add an unreasonable cost for the developer, most of which is passed
on to consumers). Rritt (1982) agrees that some claims
may be settled for less than the full principal, but he
argues that most surety companies pay claims in full and
that few cases go to court. Our data indicate that municipalities using surety bonds are neither more likely
nor less likely than municipalities using other types of
financial performance guarantees to have to go to court
to settle claims. Twenty-one percent using surety bonds
went to court one or more times between 1983 and 1988,
while 20 percent using other types of guarantees and not
using surety bonds went to court during that time.4

Cash Escrows
A cash escrow is a special bank or other third party
account that can be converted readily to a specified sum
487 AUTUMN
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of money. Usually, only local government can authorize
release of,the money to a permit holder, in accordance
with terms of the escrow. The government also can collect the money if it declares that a developer has defaulted
on specified permit obligations. Traditionally, escrows
are the second-most-common form of financial performance guarantee after surety performance bonds. For
many years bonds and cash escrows were the only performance guarantees authorized in many communities.
Cash escrows are unpopular with developers, since
they are very costly if required for the full value of improvements plus a margin of safety and are not released
until after the improvement has been completed. In order
to avoid the need for double funding of improvements,
escrow agreements often allow either partial release of
funds to developers after completion of each required
improvement and assurance that there are no unpaid bills,
or release of funds to subcontractors to complete required
improvements. When partial disbursements are made,
governments may reduce the risk of having to declare a
developer in default, but they expose themselves to the
risk of financial shortfalls if escrow accounts are exhausted before all required improvements are installed
(Seidel 1978; Schultz and Kelley 1985). That potential
can be offset to some extent, however, if interest on escrow funds is accumulated in the account and added to
the principal amount (McPherson 1974).

Property Escrows
Property escrows are structured in the same way as
cash escrows, but instead of cash, real property, such as
land, buildings and improvements, or personal property
in the form of stocks, bonds, or equipment is placed in
escrow. Property escrows have a number of disadvantages. They involve valuation of property, assurance that
property is free of liens, and, if a default occurs, the time
and bother of marketing property to obtain funds required
to complete improvements. Because of those disadvantages local governments have avoided property escrows
(Seidel 1978).

Standby Letters of Credit
A standby letter of credit is an agreement by a bank
or other financial institution to pay specified sums of
money to a third party, such as a local government, in
the event a developer defaults on responsibilities to complete required improvements to standards and on schedule, as specified in the terms of the letter. The borrower
(e.g., a developer) agrees to repay the bank in a separate
agreement.
Developers tend to favor letters of credit because they
are less expensive and more readily available than surety
bonds, while they do not require the outlay of capital
required by escrows. Standby letters of credit appeal to
local governments as well because they ensure the availability of funds if a developer defaults, and they provide
a simple mechanism for collecting the funds (a government presents the bank with documentation of default).
APA IOURNAL

Improvement Credit Agreements
An improvement credit agreement is a three-party
agreement between a developerlborrower, a bank, and
a local government in which the bank agrees to pay for
improvements as they are completed if the local government accepts the improvement. Unlike the case of a
standby letter of credit, which is used only if developers
default on their obligations, the developer and the local
government authorize the bank to make payments to the
developer and subcontractors as required improvements
are made. Improvement credit agreements ensure that
money is available to make required improvements and
that local governments will have an opportunity to approve those improvements before funds are dispersed.
Because money is dispersed incrementally, there is more
risk to local governments than with standby letters of
credit, since the line of credit could be exhausted before
all improvements are made.

Liens/Covenants
Although not technically financial performance guarantees, liens or covenants can be placed by local governments on a property being developed to record an
encumbrance on the property. The liens remain in effect
until the necessary improvements have been made and
approved. If a developer defaults on the improvements,
local governments can initiate foreclosure proceedings.
Liens remain with the property if it is transferred and
help ensure that future owners are aware of the nature
of the encumbrance.
If a developer goes bankrupt because there are usually
other liens and mortgages on property being developed,
the cash value of the local government claim may be
very limited; thus, the main purpose of the lien is to clarify
the encumbrance for future owners and to minimize the
danger of a solvent developer refusing to build an improvement to required standards.

Frequency.of Use
In 1976, Seidel(1978) surveyed 80 local governments
and found that 96 percent used performance or improvement bonds, 7 1 percent cash escrow accounts, 9 percent
real property escrow accounts, and 6 percent letters of
credit. He did not ask about the use of improvement
credit agreements or liens. We found, 12 years later, that
bonds continue to be the most frequently used financial
guarantees (Table 2). We also found that there has been
a dramatic increase in the use of letters of credit, which
are authorized for use by a majority of local governments
and now actually are used in practice more frequently
than cash escrows (see the right-hand column of Table
2), even though they are still not authorized by enabling
legislation as frequently as cash escrows. We believe that
this increase stems from the ease and relatively low cost
of obtaining letters of credit and, to a lesser extent, because local governments increasingly are encouraging
developers to use letters of credit rather than performance
improvement bonds. Governments continue to use real
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TABLE 2: Frequency of use of performance flexible limits enable local governments to allow large,
phased developments several years to finish a project
guarantees
Municipalities
authorized
to use the
guarantee
Type of guarantee
Performance or improvement
bond
Cash escrow
Letter of credit
Improvement credit agreement
Lien on development
Noncash and real property
escrow

("4

Permits that
included a
guarantee'
(average per
municipality)
("/.)

78
66
59
18
13

43
16
36
2
3

6

1

while not being forced to allow the same amount of time
for smaller projects that reasonably can be completed in
a matter of months. Among jurisdictions with inflexible
time limits, the vast majority allow developers from one
to two years after permit issuance to complete required
improvements (see Table 3.) In most cases, however, time
limits can be renewed at the discretion of the municipality
(89 percent of the municipalities surveyed) or by the developer as a matter of right (8 percent of the municipal-

TABLE 3: Requirements imposed by performance guarantees
Municipalities
(among those
using guarantees)

a. Over the past 5 years.
Guarantee characteristics

property escrows infrequently, but a larger, although still
small, proportion of governments are using improvement
credit agreements and liens.

Structure and Time Limits
Municipalities may establish guidelines regarding the
type of improvements (permanent or temporary) for
which financial guarantees are required, time limits for
the completion of improvements, and whether warranties
of performance after an improvement is completed will
be required. Our data indicate that local practices vary
widely across municipalities (Table 3). Permanent improvements include most of those dedicated to the public,
such as roads and sewers, as well as many improvements,
such as landscaping and permanent erosion-control
structures, that will remain in private hands after construction is completed. Temporary improvements, such
as temporary erosion control devices, usually remain in
private ownership and are no longer required at the end
of the construction process. Financial guarantees are far
more common for permanent improvements than for
temporary ones because permanent improvements are
more numerous, often have greater impact, and are more
likely to be dedicated to the public. Nevertheless, guarantees are important in both cases, since the damage due
to failure to provide a needed temporary improvement,
such as erosion control, can be substantial and long
lasting.
Municipalities using financial performance guarantees
give developers a specified period of time within which
to complete required improvements. At the expiration
of the time limit, developers can be declared in default,
and the municipality can use guarantee funds to complete
the improvement. A sizable minority of the municipalities
we surveyed (37 percent for permanent improvements
and 47 percent for temporary improvements) use flexible
time limits, varying the time allowed to complete improvements with the size of development projects. Such

("4

Type of improvement for which a
guarantee is required

Permanent improvements
Temporary improvements

99
69

Time limit for completing improvement

Permanent improvements
Less than 6 months
6-11 months
12-24 months
More than 24 months
Varies with project size

2
12
41
9
37

Temporary improvements
Less than 6 months
6-11 months
12-24 months
More than 24 months
Varies with project size

8
13
32
1
47

Improvement completion after
issuance of certificate of
occupancy

Not allowed
Allowed
Improvements to be privately owned
Private landscaping
Private paving projects
Private on-site sewage systems
Other private improvements
Improvements to be dedicated to the
public

31
69
47
28
4
29
27

Maintenancelperformancewarranty

Not required
Required
Length of warranty
Less than 12 months
12-24 months
More than 24 months
Varies with project size
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19
81
20
63
5
13
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ities surveyed). Only 3 percent of the jurisdictions we
surveyed prohibit extensions of time limits.
For some types of required improvements, many municipalities (69 percent of those surveyed) will issue certificates of occupancy before required improvements are
completed. Almost half of the municipalities with performance guarantees, for example, will issue certificates
of occupancy before privately owned landscaping has
been completed: about a quarter (28 percent) do the same
for privately owned paving projects. Similarly, about a
quarter of the municipalities allow developers to occupy
projects before they complete improvements to be dedicated to the public.
More than four out of every five municipalities (81
percent) using financial performance guarantees authorize or require maintenance warranties for at least some
improvements. Those warranties most commonly are required for 12 to 24 months after completion of the improvement (see Table 3).

~

~

~

~

Two of the most difficult tasks of administering financial performance guarantees are costing and releasing
guarantees. Costing is the process of establishing the
minimum dollar amount that the permittee must guarantee. The amount should be large enough to cover the
cost of the improvements the municipality would have
to provide if the developer defaults, but at the same time
it should not be so large that it creates an unreasonable
or illegal burden on permittees. Most communities (67
percent) use their own expertise in estimating the cost
of improvements. Some (29 percent) use data from permit
applicants to estimate costs, and some (21 percent) use
actual contractors’ bids (Table 4).
Municipalities generally (65 percent of those we surveyed) require that financial guarantees cover the entire
estimated cost of required improvements. A quarter of
those we surveyed have a flexible policy, sometimes requiring a financial performance guarantee for the full
cost of an improvement and sometimes not, and 10 percent require a guarantee for only part of the estimated
cost of the improvement. In addition, a majority of municipalities (68 percent) add a margin of safety to their
estimates to account for inflation and the possibility of
underestimation of costs. Among municipalities adding
a margin of safety, 5 1 percent add from 1 to 10 percent
to cost estimates, 23 percent add from 1 1 to 20 percent,
and 17 percent add 2 0 percent or more. For 9 percent
of the municipalities the exact amount of the margin of
safety was not determined.
In order to reduce project costs, developers may request that municipalities release them from financial
guarantees in stages as the project progresses. Sixty-one
percent of the municipalities responding to our survey
allow staged release of guarantee funds, but most also
keep back some funds until all improvements are completed. The percent of the entire guarantee retained until
completion varies among municipalities with a few (5
APA JOURNAL

Municipal practice

Municipalities
(”@

Costing
Source of improvementcost estimate
Municipal engineer
Permit administrator
Permit applicant
Subcontractors’ bids
Other

35
32
29
21
7

Margin of safety
None added
1-10 percent
1 1 -20 percent
21-30 percent
31 percent or more

32
33
16
7
12

Releasing
Staged release of funds
Not used

Costing and Releasing of Guarantees
~

TABLE 4: Costing and releasing financial performance guarantees

used

39
61

Percent of funds held until completion
1-10 percent
1 1 -1 9 percent
20 percent or more
Varies

57
16
21
16

Check for liens on the improvement by subcontractors and others before accepting
dedication
Sometimes or never
Always

35
65

percent) holding back as much as 40 percent of the guarantee amount. The most common practice (among 57
percent of municipalities), however, is to hold back 10
percent or less of the guarantee until final completion of
all required improvements.
Before accepting dedicated improvements, municipalities should check to ensure that all payments have been
made to subcontractors and that there are no liens on
the improvement. Actual practice, however, sometimes
differs from recommended practice. Thirty-five percent
of the municipalities we surveyed report that they do not
always check for liens before accepting dedications and
releasing guarantees.

Enforcement and Collection
Financial performance guarantees decrease the chance
that a municipality will find it necessary to use public
funds to complete unfinished improvements or to reconstruct improvements that have design or construction
defects. If guarantees are difficult to collect, however,
they fail to achieve their purpose.
Municipalities use several techniques to check for
compliance with their regulations and to determine if
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enforcement actions are necessary. Almost every municipality (98 percent) relies heavily on staff inspections.
A majority of municipalities (69 percent), however, also
require external professional certification in at least some
of their regulations or for some types of projects (e.g.,
larger projects). While an applicant’s consultant’s certification is more likely to be biased than a municipal inspection, an outside professional can inspect many aspects of a project in more detail than staff has time to
undertake. In recognition of that consideration and to
avoid the bias possible when developers pay for professional certification, a number of municipalities (29 percent) choose the consultant to perform needed inspections.
If a project is found to be out of compliance with municipal regulations or permit provisions, municipalities
have a number of options for obtaining compliance before
calling in financial guarantees. In order of the percentage
of municipalities authorized to use them, these options
include withholding the occupancy permit (93 percent
of municipalities): seeking civil penalties (83 percent):
withholding other permits for the same project (57 percent); seeking injunctive relief (49 percent): seeking
criminal remedies (40 percent): withholding sequential
permits for other lots in the same development (38 percent): and withholding permits for unrelated projects by
the same developer (9 percent) (Table 5).
In spite of these options, 40 percent of the municipalities we surveyed declared one or more developers in
default of a financial guarantee between 1983 and 1988.
Of that number, 39 percent said that after calling the
guarantee there always were enough funds to pay for
required improvements, 5 1 percent said there sometimes
were enough funds, and 10 percent reported there never
were enough funds from the guarantees to cover costs.
One of the reasons that guarantees are not always adequate to pay for improvements is that, if a permittee is
bankrupt, other creditors may attempt to collect the
guaranteed funds and may have access to those funds
before the municipality. While this rarely happens, 17
percent of the municipalities that have attempted to collect on financial guarantees report at least one experience
where creditors collected some of the money before the
municipality. Cash escrows have been accessed by creditors most frequently (this has happened in 59 percent of
the cases where attempts were made by other creditors),
because they represent direct assets of the permittee that
can be attached. In the other cases where guarantees
were accessed by creditors, 35 percent were using surety
bonds, 18 percent were using improvement credits, and
6 percent were using property escrows. Letters of credit,
if properly written, are impossible for creditors to draw
on because they represent an obligation of a bank to a
municipality, not an obligation of the permittee. Hence,
none of the municipalities that lost funds to other creditors was using a letter of credit as a guarantee.
Although in theory each type of financial guarantee
can be collected without going to court, obstacles do
arise, particularly when there are other creditors or when
APA JOURNAL

TABLE 5: Enforcement and collection of guarantees
Municipalities
Municipal practice
Sanctions to secure compliance with
regulations
Occupancy permit withheld
Civil penalties
Other permits for the same property withheld
Injunctive relief
Criminal remedies
Sequential permits withheld for b t s in the same
development
Permits for the same developer on unrelated
developments withheld
Calling in of financial performance
guarantees between 1983 and 1988
None called
Bonds
Letters of credit
Cash escrows
Improvement credit agreement
Property escrow
Adequacy of performance guarantee funds
to finish improvements when
developers have defaulted
Always enough funds
Sometimes enough funds
Never enough funds
Creditors’ accessing of funds before
municipality
Has not occurred
Has OCCUNed
Type of guarantee used
Cash escrows
Surety bonds
Improvement credit agreements
Property escrows
Letters of credit

(“4

93
83
57
49
40
38
9

60
23
20
17

2
1

39
51
10

83
17
59
35
18
6

0

guarantee language is unclear or ambiguous. Between
1983 and 1988, 20 percent of the municipalities we surveyed that declared developers in default and attempted
to collect on improvement guarantees went to court to
enforce the guarantee. That represents a total of 54 court
cases (5 of the 29 municipalities that declared developers
in default and went to court did not report the number
of cases). Presumably other cases have been settled out
of court. In addition, the costs of litigation probably discourage some municipalities from taking legal action.
Nevertheless it appears that the administration of financial performance guarantees results in only limited litigation. The percentage of municipalities using financial
guarantees that resorted to court action to collect a guarantee between 1983 and 1988 was as follows: property
escrows, 1 1 percent: lienslcovenants, 14 percent; surety
bonds, 21 percent; cash escrows, 23 percent: letters of
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credit, 25 percent; and improvement credit agreements,
32 percent.

Planners’ Evaluations
When asked to sum up their overall experience with
financial performance guarantees, 90 percent of the
planners responding to our survey evaluated them as either very effective tools (58 percent) or somewhat effective tools (32 percent) for ensuring compliance with regulations. Community size has little association with perceived effectiveness, but effectiveness ratings do vary by
type of guarantee used and other guarantee characteristics.
Planners are more likely to be pleased with the overall
effectiveness of performance guarantees when their municipality is using surety bonds, cash escrows, and/or
letters of credit. Significantly lower overall effectiveness
ratings accompany the use of real property escrows, liens,
and improvement credit agreements (less than 80 percent
of the municipalities rate their use of guarantees as very
or somewhat effective). Planners rate financial performance guarantees as more effective in achieving compliance with regulations under the following conditions:
when agreements are set to cover the entire cost of an
improvement; when higher margins of safety are used in
estimating costs; when the municipality always checks
for liens before accepting dedication of improvements;
and when creditors have not been able to access the
funds.
Municipalities have found that permittees generally
do not find financial performance guarantees unreasonably onerous. Less than 1 in 20 of the municipalities we
surveyed said they had received “many” complaints from
developers. In part, that may stem from the relatively
low cost of the guarantees to the development community. Eighty-five percent of the municipalities surveyed
estimate that guarantees cost developers 2.5 percent or
less of total project costs, and 23 percent put the cost to
developers at less than 1 percent of total project costs.

Conclusions and Policy Implications
In actual practice, financial performance guarantees
are an effective, although not infallible, means of ensuring
that improvements required as a condition for issuing
development permits and approvals will be built to specified standards if the permittee defaults. They are being
used widely and successfully by both large and small
municipalities throughout the United States, not only in
subdivision regulations, but also in other regulatory programs that require developers to construct on- and offsite improvements, and they appear to be accepted by
the development community.
Financial guarantees seem to be useful not only for
improvements dedicated to the public but also for those
that remain in private ownership after completion of development. Thus, they provide a degree of consumer

APA IOURNAL

protection in the development process. When improper
installation of privately owned facilities has the potential
to threaten public health, as is the case with septic tank
installations, they benefit the general public as well.
Although municipalities can choose among a variety
of types of financial performance guarantees, experience
in actual practice suggests that a relatively new form of
guarantee for municipalities-standby letters of credithas a number of advantages, not the least of which is
reduced exposure to loss of guarantee funds to other
creditors. Survey data reported here indicate that there
has been a substantial increase in the use of letters of
credit over the past decade. In contrast to that trend,
surety bonds and cash escrows are becoming less dominant. Surety bonds may be difficult for small and undercapitalized developers to obtain, and cash escrows
are readily accessible to other creditors in the event a
developer declares bankruptcy.
We recommend that municipalities that are not using
financial guarantees give careful consideration to the
adoption of this tool for ensuring compliance with development regulations, and that municipalities using
guarantees for some programs, such as subdivision regulations, consider their use in others, such as zoning,
stormwater management, erosion and sedimentation
control, and wetland regulations, areas where guarantees
are not commonly used at this time.
We also recommend that letters of credit be authorized
whenever any financial guarantee is allowed or required.
Letters of credit generally provide the best protection for
a municipality because they represent an obligation of a
bank that is independent of a developer’s financial situation, and they are relatively easy for developers to obtain. Letters of credit, however, may lack the flexibility
of some other types of guarantees. Thus, we also recommend that municipalities authorize use of a variety of
types of guarantees. Large developers, for example, might
find that surety bonds are easily obtainable, while small
developers, who cannot obtain a surety bond, nevertheless might have the capital to put up a cash escrow.
In conclusion, financial performance guarantees are a
powerful tool, and are being used in an increasing number
of local government regulatory programs. They are appropriate in all communities. They can improve compliance with local regulations and reduce court costs for
local governments, and they can assure consumers and
the community as a whole that development meets local
standards for the quality of the built environment.

NOTES
1 . We obtained the sample frame for the local govern-

ment survey from Municipal/County Executive Directory/ 1987 (Carroll Publishing). We did not survey
jurisdictions with populations below 1 5,000 because,
although there is a very large number of them, they
represent a small proportion of the US. population.
Their inclusion in the random sample would have
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years to collect on a performance guarantee could
skewed the sample toward very small places. That
might have been handled by drawing a stratified samhave gone to court to collect on other types of guarantees than surety bonds.
ple, but we believed the advantage in an ability to
generalize to a larger universe was more than offset
by the more cumbersome data analysis and reporting
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